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APPORTIONMENT WHEN THE LEGISLATURE FAILS TO ACT
It is a fundamental right of citizens in a democracy to be
equally represented in the legislative assembly. Most American
state constitutions seek to secure this right by providing that
the legislators shall be elected by the voters from single-member
districts made up of "compact, contiguous territory as nearly
equal in population as is possible," and by providing that the
district lines conform with natural boundaries or the boundaries
of previously established political subdivisions, such as counties.1
However, in order to maintain equality of representation with
the lapse of time, these districts cannot satisfactorily be estab-
lished once and for all in the constitution itself; but provision
must be made for their periodic re-alignment and re-apportion-
ment to compensate for the uneven growth in population and for
population shifts.2 Usually the duty to re-apportion after each
decennial national census, or after each state census if a national
census is not taken, is imposed upon the very legislative body to
be elected from the districts after they have been set up.3 Some-
1. Ala. Const. (1901) art. IV, §50, §§199, 200; Ariz. Const. (1912) art.
IV, c. 2, §§1, 11; Ark. Const. (1874) art. VIII, §§1-5; Cal. Const. (1879)
art. IV, §§5, 6; Colo. Const. (1876) art. V, §§45-47; Conn. Amendments to
Const. (1818) art. I (1828), art. XXXI (1901); Del. Const. (1897) art.
II, §2; Fla. Const. (1887) art. VII, §§2, 3; Ga. Const. (1877) art. III, §2,
par. 2, and §3, par. 1; Idaho Const. (1890) art. III, §§2, 4, 5; Ill. Const.
(1870) art. IV, §6; Ind. Const. (1851) art. IV, §2, 5, 6; Iowa Const. (1857)
art. III, §§6, 34-37; Kan. Const. (1861) art. II, §2, art. X, §§1, 2; Ky.
Const. (1891) §§31, 33; La. Const. (1921) art. III, §§2-5; Me. Const. (1820
and 1876) art. IV, pt. 1; Md. Const. (1867) art. III, §§4, 5; Mass. Const.
(1870) Amendment LXXI; Mich. Const. (1909) art. V, §§2-4; Minn. Const.
(1857) art. IV, §2; Miss. Const. (1890) art. XIII, §§254-256; Mo. Const.
(1875) art. IV, §§2-9; Mont. Const. (1889) art. V, §4; Neb. Const. (1875)
art. III, §§5, 6; Nev. Const. (1864) art. IV, §5, art. XVII, §6; N. H. Const.
(1784) pt. 2, arts. 9, 25, 26; N. J. Const. (1844) art. IV, §2, pars. 1, 2,
§3, §1; N. M. Const. (1912) art. IV, Appo'rtionment; N. Y. Const. (1938)
art. III, §§2-5; N. C. Const. (1876) art. II, §§3-5; N. Dak. Const. (1889)
art. II, §§29, 32, 35; Ohio Const. (1851) art. XI, §§1-11; Okla. Const. (1907)
Art. V, §§9(a, b), 10; Ore. Const. (1859) art. IV, §§2, 6; Pa. Const. (1874)
art. II, §§16-18; R. I. Const. (1843) art. V, §1, art. VI, §1; S. C. Const.
(1895) art. III, §§3, 4, 6; S. Dak. Const. (1889) art. XIX, §2; Tenn. Const.
(1870) art. II, §§4-6; Tex. Const. (1876) art. III, §§2, 25, 26; Utah Const.
(1895) art. IX, §§2, 3; Vt. Const. (1793) c. II, §18; Va. Const. (1902) art.
IV, §§41-43; Wash. Const. (1889) art. II, §§2, 3; W. Va. Const. (1872)
art. VI, §§2, 4, 7, 11; Wis. Const. (1848) art. IV, §§2, 3; Wyo. Const.
(1889) art. III-A, §§1-3; Model State Constitution (1941) §13.
2. Hilpert, Making Representative Government Representative (1939)
13 Ohio Law Rep. 481, 483.
3. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IV, §7 is typical; the only exceptions are
Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, and Ohio, which have special methods. See
Ariz. Const. (1912) art. IV, c. 2, §11 (board of supervisors of each county
redistricts); Ark. Const. (1874) art. VIII, §§1-5 (board of apportionment
composed of governor, secretary of state, and attorney-general) ; Del. Const.
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times, however, this duty has been devolved upon a committee
of executive officers, acting ex officiis,4 an administrative agency,5
or the regular judiciary,6 in order to lessen the possibility that
the re-apportionment or failure to re-apportion seasonably will be
influenced by self-serving political considerations.
Experience under the single-member district system shows that
all too often the agency, or agencies, charged with the duty to
re-apportion have failed to act over periods of time long enough
to cause gross inequalities of voting power, or have, in re-appor-
tioning, "gerrymandered" the districts and thus violated the
basic requirements of a fair election system.7 These practices
early raised the question of the power of the judiciary to compel
reapportionment or otherwise control the exercise of the power.
In the leading case of Fergus v. Marks8 it was held that man-
(1897) art. II, §2 (specific districts set out in constitution); Ohio Const.
(1851) art XI, §§1-11 (mathematical ratio for legislators, with districts
laid out-governor publishes ratio of representation after each census).
4. Cal. Const. (1879) art. IV, §6 (reapportionment commission consist-
ing of lieutenant-governor, attorney-general, surveyor-general, secretary of
state, and state superintendent of public instruction); Ark. Const. (1874)
art. VIII, §1 (board of apportionment consisting of governor, secretary of
state, and the attorney-general) ; Ohio Const. (1851) art. XI, §11 (governor,
secretary of state, and auditor).
5. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IV, §3, which reads, "When any county shall
be entitled to more than one Representative, the County Court shall cause
such county to be subdivided into districts of compact and contiguous terri-
tory, corresponding in number to the Representatives to which such county
is entitled, and in population as nearly equal as may be, in each of which
the qualified voters shall elect one Representative, who shall be a resident
of such district: Provided, That when any county shall be entitled to more
than ten Representatives, the circuit court shall cause such county to be
subdivided into districts, so as to give each district not less than two nor
more than four Representatives, who shall be residents of such district-
the population of such districts to be proportioned to the number of Repre-
sentatives to be elected therefrom"; and §6, which reads in part, " * * *
When any county shall be entitled to more than one Senator, the circuit
court shall cause such county to be subdivided into districts of compact and
contiguous territory, and of population as nearly equal as may be, cor-
responding in number with the Senators to which such county may be en-
titled; and in each of these one Senator, who shall be a resident of such
district, shall be elected by the qualified voters thereof." In the case of
State ex rel. Major v. Patterson (1910) 229 Mo. 373, 129 S. W. 888, the
Supreme Court of Missouri decided that these two sections do not confer
original power of apportionment upon the county court, but that an act of
apportionment by the legislature is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the
court to district the county. See also, in this connection, Ariz. Const. (1912)
art. IV, c. 2, §11, conferring redistricting power on the board of super-
visors of each county.
6. See the Missouri provision in note 5, above.
7. See Hilpert, Making Representative Government Representative (1939)
18 Ohio Law Rep. 481, 483, 484.
8. (1926) 321 Ill. 510, 152 N. E. 557, 46 A. L. R. 960.
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damus would not lie to compel the legislature to re-apportion the
state into senatorial districts because this power was specifically
legislative and the doctrine of the separation of powers precluded
the courts from compelling the performance of a legislative duty.9
Therefore, if the duty to re-apportion is imposed upon the legis-
lature and it fails to act, the only recourse is to the people through
the polls, unless an intermediate recourse to some other agency
'is specifically provided in the state constitution. When the duty
to re-apportion rests initially or secondarily on some other
agency, such has an ex officio committee or the courts, as it does
by some constitutions, 0 some courts have held that mandamus,
or some other appropriate writ, will lie to compel such agency
to proceed to the task of re-apportioning, although the courts will
not control the mode of re-apportionment in detail. 1 . Missouri,
however, seems to extend the doctrine of Fergus v. Marks, supra,
to any official body charged with the duty of re-apportionment,
on the theory that such official is a "Miniature Legislature,"12
against which, consequently, mandamus will not lie.13
Once there has been an apportionment, however, a degree of
judicial control is possible, although the extent to which the
courts will review the action of the apportioning agency depends
upon the wording of the constitutional mandate. 4 Generally only
in the case of a clear abuse of discretion will the court declare
the act invalid. 5 Where there is a violation of the usual consti-
9. Blair, J., dissenting in State ex rel. Lashly v. Becker (1921) 290 Mo.
560, 600, 235 S. W. 1017, 1032, suggests in addition that the legislature is
too numerous a body to be subject to the writ of mandamus.
10. Notes 3-5, supra.
11. Donovan v. Suffolk County Apportionment Comm'rs (1916) 225 Mass.
55, 113 N. E. 740, 2 A. L. R.. 1334; Merrill v. Mitchell (1926) 257 Mass.
184, 153 N. E. 562; Brooks v. State ex rel. Singer (1904) 162 Ind. 568,
70 N. E. 980; see State ex rel. Gallagher v. Campbell (1891) 48 Ohio St.
435, 27 N. E. 884, 885. In these cases the writ, although spoken of as
"mandamus," is in the nature of procedendo.
12. State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock (1912) 241 Mo. 433, 146 S. W. 40.
13. For further discussions of mandamus against government officials
see Comments (1940) 26 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 134 and (1941)
26 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 442.
14. Some courts call this a political matter, and refuse to look into it
(State ex rel. Cromelian v. Boyd (1893) 36 Neb. 181, 54 N. W. 252, 19
L. R. A. 227), others say it presents a juridical question, rather than politi-
cal, and the courts have jurisdiction (Parker v. State ex rel. Powell (1882)
133 Ind. 197, 32 N. E. 836, 18 L. R. A. 567, reh. den. 33 N. E. 119; State
ex rel. Morris v. Wrightson (1883) 56 N. J. L. 126, 28 Atl. 56, 22 L. R. A.
548; State ex rel. Att'y Gen'l v. Cunningham (1892) 81 Wis. 440, 51 N. W.
724, 15 L. R. A. 561).
15. As one court said in denying mandamus, "The deviation from equality
of population must be so grave, palpable, and unreasonable that argument
would not be necessary to convince a fair minded man that injustice has
been done." People ex rel. Baird v. Ed. of Sup'rs of Kings County (1893)
138 N. Y. 95, 33 N. F. 827, 20 L. R. A. 81.
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tutional requirements of equality of population, and compactness
and contiguity of territory, the redistricting may be set aside.16
If the court invalidates the new plan, the old apportionment re-
mains in effect.17 But, as expressed by Ostrander, J., dissenting
in Williams v. Secretary of State,18 this result may leave the state
with a less representative system than if the new apportionment
were permitted to stand. Where the duty to re-apportion rests
on some agency other than the legislature, the courts of some
states will, in a proper case, invalidate a re-apportionment act,
and by mandamus compel the official charged with the responsi-
bility to proceed to draft a new act.'9 But this does not solve
the problem where the legislature is vested with the power, since
mandamus will not issue against it, nor where another agency is
vested with the power, when, as in Missouri, the courts will not
allow mandamus to lie against it.
The Missouri constitutional provisions for apportionment of
legislative districts are to be found in article IV, sections 2-9,
of the Constitution of 1875. Section 7, with which we are here
most concerned, provides that the general assembly shall make
the apportionment after each United States census, but, if it
fails or refuses to district the state for any reason, the governor,
attorney-general, and secretary of state shall perform such duty
within thirty days after the adjournment of the legislature upon
which that duty devolved. This would seem to provide an alter-
native procedure if the legislature does not act, but the Supreme
Court of Missouri, in the case of State ex rel. Lashly v. Becker,20
16. The procedure followed in the various states differs, some allowing
injunction (Broom v. Wood (D. C. S. D. Miss. 1932) 1 F. Supp. 134;
Bailey v. Abington (Ark. 1941) 148 S. W. (2d) 176; Denny v. State (1896)
144 Ind. 503, 42 N. E. 929, 31 L. R. A. 726; Ragland v. Anderson (1907)
125 Ky. 141, 100 S. W. 865, 128 Am. St. Rep. 242; Stiglitz v. Schardien
(1931) 289 Ky. 799, 40 S. W. (2d) 315; Williams v. Woods (Tex. Civ. App.
1914) 162 S. W. 1031; State ex rel. Att'y Genl v. Cunningham (1892) 81
Wis. 440, 51 N. W. 724, 15 L. R. A. 561), others granting mandamus to
accomplish the result of injunction (Bd. of Sup'rs of Houghton County v.
Blacker (1892) 92 Mich. 638, 52 N. W. 951, 16 L. R. A. 432; Williams v.
Sec'y of State (1906) 145 Mich. 447, 108 N. W. 749; In re Sherrill (1907)
188 N. Y. 185, 81 N. E. 124, 117 Am. St. Rep. 841, rev'g (1906) 114 App.
Div. 890, 101 N. Y. S. 858; State ex rel. Harte v. Moorhead (1916) 99 Neb.
527, 156 N. W. 1067; see People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson (1895) 155
Ill. 451, 40 N. E. 307; State ex rel. Meighen v. Weatherill (1914) 125 Minn.
886, 147 N. W. 105; State ex rel. Warson v. Howell (1916) 92 Wash. 540r,
159 Pac. 777), and others granting special statutory review (Armstrong v.
Mitten (1984) 95 Colo. 425, 37 F. (2d) 757; In re Livingston (1916) 96
Misc. 841, 160 N. Y. S. 462).
17. Williams v. Secretary of State (1906) 145 Mich. 447, 108 N. W. 749.
18. (1906) 145 Mich. 447, 108 N. W. 749, 751.
19. Note 11, supra.
20. (1921) 290 Mo. 560, 235 S. W. 1017.
19421
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held that the alternative procedure in this statute is ineffective
because it does not allow the referendum. The reasoning of the
court was that re-districting the state, being a legislative duty,
may not be vested in the executive. Article IV, section 5721 pro-
vides that the legislative authority shall be vested in a legislative
-assembly, but that the people reserve to themselves the power
to initiate or reject laws, and it was the purpose of this section 2
to gather all legislative power or authority in one legislative
-forum, in order that it might be subject to the initiative and
referendum. The decision in that case was not unanimous, and
may be criticized, but it is the law of the state,22 and was re-
affirmed in State ex rel. Gordon v. Becker.24 Thus the situation
in Missouri is comparable to that in most other states, that is,
full responsibility for re-districting the state rests upon the legis-
Jlature, which is not subject to mandamus in the performance
of its duties, and whose acts can only be invalidated if they
clearly contravene the language of the constitution.
The single-member district system thus seems to present an
insoluble dilemma. There seems to be no means, under estab-
lished principles of American jurisprudence, for placing the duty
to re-apportion on an agency against which mandamus will lie,
where the vice complained of is inaction. Putting the duty to
re-district, either initially or in the alternative, upon an agency
other than the legislature seems at most only to permit judicial
action compelling such agency to proceed with its work, without
compelling its completion, at least not in any particular manner.
21. Mo. Const. (1875) as amended November 3, 1908. Mo. Laws of 1909,
906.
22. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IV, §57.
23. It is not, however, the law of California, which has a provision
similar to the Missouri provision, but carefully including the right of the
people to the referendum. Cal. Const. (1879) art. IV, §6, as amended 1926,
reads in part, " * * * should the Legislature at the first regular session
following any decennial Federal census fail to reapportion the Assembly
and Senatorial districts, a Reapportionment Commission, which is hereby
created, consisting of the Lieutenant-Governor, who shall be chairman, and
the Attorney-General, Surveyor-General, Secretary of State and State
Superintendent of Public Instruction, shall forthwith apportion such dis-
tricts in accordance with the provisions of this section and such apportion-
ment of said districts shall be immediately effective the same as if the act
of said Reapportionment Commission were an act of the Legislature,
subject, however, to the same provisions of referendum as apply to
the acts of the Legislature." Note also that this provision would be a
better one for Missouri than that in the present constitution because the
governor is not on the commission. For problems connected with mandamus
against the governor in Missouri, see Comment (1941) 26 WASHINGTON U.
LAw QUARTERLY 442.
24. (1932) 329 Mo. 1053, 49 S. W. (2d) 146.
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There is a modicum of judicial review possible to invalidate obvi-
ous abuses of power ;25 and yet the constitutional requirements of
equality in population and compactness and contiguity of terri-
tory seem to leave a considerable area where a "gerrymander"
is beyond effective judicial control. Moreover, the constitutional
mandates seem in all cases to be couched in broad and general
terms, and this is, no doubt, from the very nature of constitu-
tions, necessarily so. Yet every effort should be made to draw the
constitutional requirements as closely as possible to widen the
area of judicial control when re-apportioning action is taken. If
this is supplemented by devolving the duty to operate the consti-
tutional mandate upon an agency that is expressly made subject
to a writ in the nature of procedendo, the dilemma presented by
the single-member district system is solved in part.
2 6
Many students of government would avoid, rather than solve,
the dilemma by substituting for the single-member district sys-
tem multi-membered districts and any one of several methods of
voting which insure either proportional or at least minority rep-
resentation. 27 It is perhaps significant that a committee of emi-
25. But, there are problems arising from the decisions of the courts them-
selves, when the legislature has acted and they are called upon to deter-
mine the validity of an apportionment act. As Higbee, J., dissenting in
State ex rel. Lashly v. Becker (1921) 290 Mo. 560, 235 S. W. 1017, 1037
ff., clearly pointed out, frequently the issue reaches into the courts them-
selves, so that political decisions are, unconsciously perhaps, reached, with
the courts divided along party lines. It will be interesting to see whether
this has been avoided since the adoption of the non-partisan method of ap-
pointing judges, as opposed to the old elective system.
26. Consider the amendment proposed by the Constitutional Convention
of Missouri, 1922-23, submitted for adoption in 1924: "Such apportionment
shall be made by the Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney-General, State
Auditor and State Treasurer, or a majority of them, within sixty days
after the result of such census has been ascertained.
"Such officers shall file in the office of the Secretary of State a full state-
ment signed by them or a majority of them containing the districts, their
numbers, and the names of the counties in each. Upon the filing of such
statement the new districting shall be in full force and effect.
"The acts of such officers shall be ministerial and mandatory and shall
not be subject to the referendum and failure to perform shall be cause for
impeachment, and neglect or refusal or failure to properly perform within
the time herein prescribed shall not discharge such officers of such duty,
but the same shall continue until fully performed."
It is to be wondered whether this provision would eliminate the difficulties
of apportionment. Be that as it may, the proposed amendment was over-
whelmingly defeated at the polls.
27. For discussions of these plans, see Hilpert, Making Representative
Government Representative (1939) 13 Ohio Law Rep. 481; Hoag and Hal-
lett Proportional Representation (1937) passim; Luce, Legislative Prin-
o(ples (1930) 247-256; Graves, American State Government (1936) 143-150.
Where the membership of such multi-membered districts is arbitrarily
assigned the problem herein discussed is, however, only alleviated and not
1942]
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nent American political scientists has suggested the use of the
Hare system of the single transferable vote (popularly known
as "P. R.") in the election of state legislatures.2 It would seem,
in view of the difficulties encountered in operating the single-
member district system, that other methods of electing the Mis-
souri general assembly may be examined with profit by a con-
stitutional convention.29
J. L. D.
R. S. S.
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST
OFFICE-HOLDING BY LEGISLATORS
COMMISSION ON INTERSTATE COOPERATION
The Constitution of California prohibits a member of the legis-
lature from holding any "office, trust, or employment" under the
state.' A statute established the California Commission on Inter-
state Cooperation, consisting of five members of each house of
the legislature, for the purpose of investigating legislative prob-
lems common to the several states. No compensation was pro-
vided, but members might receive reimbursement for necessary
expenses. Plaintiffs, members of the Commission, sought a writ
of mandate to compel defendant, Controller of the State of Cali-
fornia, to issue warrants reimbursing them for sums expended
in carrying out the duties of the Commission. In Parler v. Riley,
2
it was held that the writ would issue, since the legislature has
the right to legislate on the problems handled by the Commission;
and, when it has the right to act, it must be given the use of
entirely solved. For a suggestion which would seem more nearly to avoid
the dilemma, see Hilpert, supra, at 491: "If instead the total legislative
membership only were determined and these were allocated to each district
in each election upon the basis of the proportion the total vote of that dis-
trict bore, to the total vote of the state, not only would the objections stated
in the preceding paragraph be met, but a further inducement to 'get out
the vote,' would be provided. Or, the total legislative membership could
be left variable and the quota necessary to elect a member be determined-
each district's membership being dependent upon the number of times its
total vote fills this quota. A similar arrangement is provided in the new
New York City charter for determining the representation as among the
several boroughs, although the councilmanic representation of each borough
is elected by the Hare system of the single transferable vote."
28. National Municipal League, Model State Constitution (1941) §302.
29. This would seem to be more desirable since the proponents of these
election systems claim for them advantages other than merely the avoidance
of the perplexing problem discussed in this note.
1. Cal. Const. (1879) Art. IV, See. 19.
2. (1941) 113 P. (2d) 873.
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